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I. INTRODUCTION
My purpose here is to defend a simple if unpopular thesis. I
assume that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has an
appropriate range of applicability. The scope of the First Amend-
ment should be determined by the broadest range of purposes or
values that can coherently be thought to underlie the Free Speech
Clause. Where free speech values are not significantly implicated
by any given expression or conduct, the expression is not entitled to
protection under the Free Speech Clause. The distinction between
expression that is not protected and expression to be accorded limited
free speech protection is often not difficult to recognize. When
properly drawn, this distinction should expedite the sound resolu-
tion of many otherwise problematic free speech cases.
The unpopularity of this argument flows from its incompatibility
with two schools of thought. The first would substitute "expres-
sion" for "speech," and considers tolerance, pluralism, and diver-
sity to be ultimate goods. It therefore detects speech, and free
speech issues, in the most curious of contexts. This school flirts
with constitutionalizing libertarianism in an outer sphere of general
social conduct in order, it is alleged, more securely to protect the
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inner sphere of genuine speech. The second, opposing school, of
less current practical influence but with unquestioned intellectual
credentials, would limit the protection of the Free Speech Clause to
a few selected free speech values. Both schools impose unnecessary
costs in establishing free speech values.
"Speech" for free speech purposes is not an unproblematic con-
cept in all contexts. It is simultaneously broader and narrower than
speech in its literal sense of the spoken word. Free speech values
may conflict in a given case, tugging a given instance of expression
simultaneously toward or away from recognition as "speech." The
approach offered here, however, aims at increased analytical sim-
plicity while preserving the possibility of vigorous application of
the Free Speech Clause within its proper and legitimate sphere.
II. FREE SPEECH VALUES
Were we able to ask the drafters of the First Amendment,
"Now, when you refer to freedom of speech, do you mean to
include, say, commercial nude dancing as a form of speech?" the
answer, one suspects, would square poorly with current judicial
decisions. But the possibility remains that the drafters chose the
open-textured term "speech" just so that we, of a later generation,
could include such activities within its purview.
It seems evident that "[w]e know very little of the precise inten-
tions of the framers and ratifiers of the speech and press clauses of
the first amendment."' Under these circumstances, one approach
that might set constitutional theory on a sound jurisprudential basis
would be to turn to the classic texts in defense of First Amendment
activities for guidance in delimiting the concept of speech; Socrates,
John Milton, Locke, Hume, and John Stuart Mill would be obvious
sources. We should be disturbed if the classic philosophical expo-
nents of freedom of thought and discussion cannot be fairly enlisted
in support of our contemporary free speech case law.
This course, however, is rarely taken directly or explicitly, both
because there is ample free speech case law precedent, and because
it can hardly be claimed that someone like Mill, however titanic his
stature, influenced the drafters of the First Amendment. Moreover,
the classic texts are themselves not without difficulties of interpre-
'Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J., concurring).
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tation. The reader may therefore wish to interpret "Millian" values
as referring simply to all coherently defensible values particularly
underlying the Free Speech Clause.
There is at least a fair consensus as to the major contemporary
and historical candidates for free speech values or underlying pur-
poses. One broad formulation refers to: "1. The development of the
faculties of the individual; 2. The happiness to be derived from
engaging in the activity; 3. The provision of a safety valve for
society; and, 4. The discovery and spread of political truth."'2 An-
other frequently cited broad formulation holds:3
Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as a
method of assuring individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of
attaining the truth, (3) as a method of securing participation by
the members of the society in social, including political, deci-
sion-making, and (4) as a means of maintaining the balance be-
tveen stability and change in the society.
Other relatively inclusive formulations of First Amendment or,
more specifically, free speech values include those of Professor
Stone, who cites the "search for truth," meaningful participation in
self-government, and individual "self-fulfillment,"4 and perhaps
Chaffee, who refers to both an "individual interest" in "the need of
many men to express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is
to be worth living, and a social interest in the attainment of truth,
so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of action
but carry it out in the wisest way."'
Before such broader formulations can be adopted, they must
survive the critique of those who have taken any of a variety of
narrower views of free speech, and they must have their own inter-
nal ambiguities resolved. What will be left in the end is a set of
considerations with some surprising implications that I shall refer
2 Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 24-25
(197 1)(reformulating for purposes of critique the doctrine of Justice Brandeis expressed in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)).
3 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment 3 (1966). See also Blous-
tein, The Origin, Validity, and Interrelationships of the Political Values Served by Freedom
of Expression, 33 Rutgers L. Rev. 372, 373 (1981); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev. 964, 990-91 (1978).
4 Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 193
(1983).
' Chaffee, Free Speech in the United States 33 (1967).
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to as Millian values.6 To fail to implicate Millian values in some
respect is, in that respect, not to be speech at all for free speech
purposes.
Three of the most eminent contemporary American scholars
who have sought to limit the scope of coverage of the free speech
clause have been Alexander Meiklejohn, 7 Alexander Bickel,' and
Robert Bork.' Professor Meiklejohn's distinction between speech
implicating the public welfare and speech implicating merely pri-
vate goods' ° is perhaps elastic enough to encompass most of what
would be considered protected speech under the broader free
speech value conceptions."' But to the extent that for Meiklejohn
the touchstone of free speech coverage is speech bearing on "issues
with which voters have to deal,"" Meiklejohn's theory is either
unduly narrow or misleadingly phrased.
An exclusive concern with issues that we must or may address as
voters, expansive as such a category may be, does not seem a felici-
tous way of capturing what we recognize intuitively as at least one
among other free speech values: "[o]ur personal growth... intellec-
tual, emotional, aesthetic, professional, vocational, civic, and
6 The term "Millian values" is used for convenience, but the concept draws its strength as
well from the writings of the consensually acknowledged classic champions of liberty of
inquiry, thought, and discussion, dating from Socrates' Apologia.
7 See, e.g., A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 26-27, 79-80 (1965).
s See Bickel, The Morality of Consent 61-75 (1975).
9 See Bork, note 2 supra, at 23-25. Ronald Dworkin's approach is difficult to classify. Ile
suggests that the "strongest arguments" ordinarily marshaled in free speech cases-a right to
listen to argument or to an equal voice in the political process-are not implicated in most
pornography cases. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 335 (1985). He finds "the literature
celebrating freedom of speech and press" to be unpromising in justifying a reluctance to
censor in the context of pornography. Id. at 336. Dworkin goes on to support a "rights-
based," as opposed to a "goals-based," approach to pornography. Dworkin's argument is
that, even if pornography in its various forms imposes long-term net costs on the commu-
nity, censorship is wrong where it violates an egalitarian "right of moral independence." I le
ultimately concludes "that the right to moral independence, if it is a genuine right, requires a
permissive legal attitude toward the consumption of pornography in private." Id. at 358.
Dworkin's argument is not addressed to a particularly American or constitutional context, so
it is unclear whether he wants to protect most private consumption of pornography by
expanding the Free Speech and Press Clauses or by calling into play substantive due process"privacy" rights or even the Equal Protection Clause.
10 See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 94 (1948).
11 See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, in 1961 Supreme Court Review
245, 262-63.
12 Meiklejohn, note 10 supra, at 93-94.
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moral."13 While it is far from true that everything implicating our
emotional growth, for example, or every expression of emotionality
implicates free speech values, certainly the category of personal
development' 4 is useful in accounting for why a given expression
counts as speech or as protected speech. "
Alexander Bickel may also be taken to have restricted the broad
free speech value formulations when, in modifying Chaffee's for-
mulation, 6 he confines the scope of the "social" interest to "the
interest in the successful operation of the political process."'" The
political can obviously be defined in narrower or broader terms,
and conceptions of what is required successfully to operate a con-
stitutional government vary in breadth.' 8 Paradoxically, what is
required to operate the political process successfully probably itself
depends on the scope of constitutional protection accorded to
speech, so Bickel's formulation may be of limited value. If the
political process is thought of narrowly, Bickel's formulation is
arbitrarily underinclusive, in that civic-minded persons would, as
civic-minded persons, tend to care about and wish to express pub-
licly their opinions on "nonpolitical" matters as much as on "polit-
ical" concerns. 1 9
t Bloustein, note 3 supra, at 373.
*4 This formulation raises the unsolved problem of whether a system of free speech, or
meaningful free speech, requires the affirmative availability, perhaps by government provi-
sion, of open opportunities for education, travel, employment, social class interaction, and
such.
1. It should be said in partial defense of Meiklejohn's "voter-issue" formulation that it
properly includes a portion of what Professor Baker refers to as "solitary" uses of speech,
e.g., recording, cataloging, outlining, and writing notes to oneself. See Baker, note 3 supra, at
993. Recording and organizing privately one's thoughts on political issues would be pro-
tected by both Meiklejohn and Baker, even if the recorded and organized thoughts are not
intended for any direct subsequent communication. But certainly not all private acts of
expression, or self-definition qualify as speech, with or without the presence of an audience.
One can certainly help define the kind of person one is by riding horses and chopping wood
by hand at one's ranch or by consuming particular products, but such acts are not ordinary
speech. Contra id. at 994.
16 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
17 Bickel, note 8 supra, at 62.
'8 See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale LJ. 1105, 1112 (1979).
'9 The Supreme Court has properly observed that "[elven though political speech is en-
titled to the fullest possible measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other
communications that command the same respect. An assertion that 'Jesus Saves,' that 'Abor-
tion is Murder,' that every woman has the 'Right to Choose,' or that 'Alcohol Kills,' may
have a claim to a constitutional exemption ... that is just as strong as 'Robert Vincent-City
Council.' " Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2135
(1984).
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In focusing attention on "explicitly and predominantly political
speech,"2 ° Bork notes: 21
The First Amendment indicates that there is something special
about speech. We would know that much even without a first
amendment, for the entire structure of the Constitution creates a
representative democracy, a form of government that would be
meaningless without freedom to discuss government and its
policies. Freedom for political speech could and should be in-
ferred even if there were no first amendment.
The problem with proceeding thus to confine the scope of the Free
Speech Clause is, of course, that this interpretation assumes the
Clause's redundancy. While it is certainly possible to argue that the
drafters inserted this express protection of political speech merely
for reasons of expediency, and not genuinely to amend the Con-
stitution, it is at least equally plausible to suggest that the Free
Speech Clause was intended to add something meaningful and that
the drafters could well have inserted the qualifier "political" had
they meant to so confine the Clause.
Narrow formulations of the scope of and values underlying the
Free Speech Clause tend, therefore, to be unduly arbitrary. But
this does not mean that the broader formulations of free speech
values are unproblematic. Writers such as Martin Redish2 ' have
explicitly recognized that what is variously referred to as the value
of self-realization, or development, of "self-fulfillment," or auton-
omy, conceals an ambiguity.23 For convenience, this ambiguity will
be referred to in terms of autonomy, and autonomy 2. AutonomyI,
which can safely be regarded as a Millian value and is at least
arguably defensible as a coherent element of distinctive free speech
20 Bork, note 2 supra, at 26.
21 Id. at 23.
22 See Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1982).
23 Cf. Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Inquiry 56-58 (1982) (not acknowledging a
broader and narrower sense of autonomy but rejecting autonomy as a value underlying a
distinctive free speech principle). It should be noted that, while Schauer does not recognize
even autonomy, or self-realization in the narrow sense as an element of a distinctive free
speech principle, this will make no significant difference to the argument that follows. One
may conclude that Schauer either underplays the direct and substantial connection between
autonomy, and free speech or else that he is precisely on target. Whichever, the analysis of
the case law areas below should be unaffected. See id. at 56. The ambiguity at issue is
illustrated by Emerson's use of the phrase "the affirmation of self." Emerson, note 3 supra, at
5, and by Scanlon's use of "autonomy" in Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, I
Phil. & Pub. Affairs 204 (1972).
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values, is connected with self-realization in the sense utilized by
Mill and draws on the developmental dynamic that is described by
writers as diverse as Aristotle and Hegel. This sense of autonomy
or self-realization is associated with what Isaiah Berlin has referred
to as "positive liberty." 4
Autonomy2 , or autonomy in the broader sense, has no essential
reference to progress, growth, development, or cultivation of one's
"higher powers" and is associated more with simply doing as one
likes, generally, or with an absence of socially imposed restraint on
one's actions and choices. Autonomy 2, or Berlin's "negative lib-
erty," however valuable it may be, is simply too broadly conceived
to support a free speech principle above and beyond a general
libertarianism. 2' Then, too, it will be a rare case indeed in which
suppression of the freedom of speech of one group does not simulta-
neously advance the broad "negative liberty" or autonomy 2 of an-
other, perhaps larger, group. Autonomy 2 may therefore be at most
of limited usefulness in deciding free speech cases or in deciding
what is to count as speech.
Of course, even the theorists subscribing to a broader conception
of free speech values have occasionally been subject to criticism for
excessively restrictive categorization. Professor Tribe has warned
that 26
[h]owever tempting it may be to resist governmental claims for
restricting speech by retreating to an artificially narrowed zone
and then defending it without limit, any such course is likely in
24 See Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Four Essays on Liberty 118, 122-31 (1969).
But cf. MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76 Phil. Rev. 321 (1967) (critically
placing Berlin's negative versus positive freedom distinction in proper perspective). See also
Bay, The Structure of Freedom (1958); F. Oppenheim, Dimensions of Freedom (1961).
21 While Mill could, with some qualifications, be classified in at least certain respects as a
conduct libertarian, his defense of freedom of "thought and discussion" has much more to
do with "flourishing" than with any value associated more broadly with "doing as one likes."
In any event, Schauer's dismissal of autonomy as a distinctive First Amendment value is at
least as cogent when confined to autonomy2 . Schauer was on this score anticipated by Robert
Bork, who argued that "the development of individual faculties and the achievement of
pleasure... do not distinguish speech from any other activity. An individual may develop
his faculties or derive pleasure from trading on the stock market." Bork, note 2 supra, at 25.
Again, the case law argument below does not depend on whether one perceives a special
relationship between autonomy, and free speech, or at least a closer relationship than be-
tween autonomy, and free speech. For a critique of Bork's approach, see Wellington, note 18
supra, at 1120-21. But see Yudof, In Search of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev.
1139, 1348-49 (1983).
26 See Tribe, American Constitutional Law 579 & id. n.25 (1978).
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the end to sacrifice too much to strategic maneuver: the claims
for suppression will persist, and the defense will be no stronger
for having withdrawn to arbitrarily constricted territory.
The trick, of course, is to tell artificial from principled constriction,
and it will be argued here that the "Millian values" help us to do so.
In the meantime, it should be recognized that artificially expand-
ing the zone of protected speech beyond that justified by the princi-
ples and purposes underlying freedom of speech may disserve those
values and impose costs in other ways. Strategically, it is not true
that the free speech "army" cannot overextend its position.27 It is
certainly plausible to argue, as against Tribe, that a refusal to trivi-
alize or debase the Free Speech Clause by extending its application
beyond the bounds of its coherent, identifiable purposes helps to
enhance and dignify the invocation of the Clause within the full
extent of its legitimate scope. If we wish to honor its intrinsic
importance, we do so by supporting free speech principles inten-
sively, on every appropriate occasion.
III. MILLIAN VALUES AND THE REQUIREMENT
OF A SOCIAL IDEA
The recognizable, distinctive values or purposes underlying
a free speech principle, tied together as Millian values, impose
certain requirements on what is to count as speech. In terms of
Millian values, for something to be speech it must embody or con-
vey a more or less discernible idea, doctrine, conception, or argu-
ment of a social nature, where "social" is understood to include
broadly political, religious, ethical, and cultural concerns. For lan-
guage or gesture or conduct to be speech, it must carry implications
beyond the speaker's individual and immediate circumstances.
Speech must communicate; it must be, at least potentially, socially
"fertile," and not socially sterile or exclusively ego-referential.
Speech, certainly, can be almost purely factual and empirical or
normative and evaluative, or informal, or false, or internally incon-
sistent, or pernicious, or irresponsible; it can go unheard or even be
intended for an audience of only the speaker. What it cannot be is
27 Cf. Schauer, note 23 supra, at 134-35 ("[tlhe broader the scope of the right, the more
likely it is to be weaker, largely because widening the scope increases the likelihood of
conflict with other interests, some of which may be equally or more important").
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patently sterile, without implication for our collective arrange-
ments and institutions, broadly understood. Self-servingness is not
definitive, though; self-serving speech in a marketplace may well
not be protected speech, but self-serving speech about the market-
place probably is.
Generalizations about putative speech in particular contexts,
such as commercial speech or, as discussed below, in the context of
nude dancing or other entertainment, or disorderly conduct arrests,
should only be drawn inductively by examining a run of individual
cases, judicially decided on a case-by-case basis. The stakes in-
volved-the risks of either trivializing the guarantee or of sup-
pressing legitimate speech-are so high that conclusively
presuming putative speech in any particular social context to be
or not to be First Amendment speech seems ill advised.
While speech can be vague, or equivocal, or metaphorical, or
guarded, or aesopic, this does not mean that the presence of speech
depends on the efforts, or successful efforts, of an intended audi-
ence, bystanders, or third parties. A verbalization may causally
provoke or incite action or inspire thought, speech, or action in
others without being speech. A glimpse of a starving child may
inspire an ethical debate or change a foreign policy without the
child's presence being speech, just as a flower placed in a crannied
wall may inspire the poet without speaking or amounting to speech.
If one has no significant social message to impart, however con-
fused or apparently foolish or inarticulate or ill formed, the creativ-
ity of the listener cannot constitute one's words as speech in this
sense. If one has sent a social message, however, even if none was
received, or if an entirely different message was received, one has
engaged in speech, even if imperfectly.
If talk or conduct does not rise to the level of speech, symbolic or
otherwise, this does not mean that such talk or conduct is without
practical, statutory, or even constitutional protection. If talk is
genuinely or even widely perceived as sterile, there may be little
incentive for a government to expend resources in suppressing it.
Even where such incentives exist, other constitutional safeguards
apart from the Free Speech Clause may come into play. These may
28 teFeinclude, beyond due process, the Free Exercise of Religion
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the right to vote, the right to
," See Meiklejohn, note 7 supra, at 79.
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travel, free assembly and the right to petition, as well as freedoms
of association and privacy.29 Whatever the constitutional concept,
there may be some comfort to be secured from the strong historical
tendency of dictatorial regimes to suppress on the ground of alleged
harmfulness, or falsity, or unorthodoxy, or as blasphemous, or
reactionary, none of which denies the presence of a social idea.
Selective enforcement problems are minimized because potential
oppressors cannot resist the temptation to label opposing ideas as
bad social ideas, thereby admitting that they are some sort of social
ideas, and thereby giving the game away.
The reasons for placing these restrictions on the concept of
speech reflect the nature of Millian values. Mill's defense of the
regime of free speech or, more particularly, of liberty of thought
and discussion, was informed not by an undifferentiated liber-
tarianism but by a vision of the progressive enlightened develop-
ment of a society. Victorian progressives such as Mill were perhaps
not so sanguine as to believe that humanity's "prospects of creating
a rational and enlightened civilization [were] virtually unlimited,"30
but it is clear that Mill's thinking is not adequately reflected by
focusing on a condition of "negative liberty" or on a mere absence
of restraint. The end is social progress through individual charac-
ter development. Without suggesting, of course, that good char-
acter should generally be legally enforced, Mill believed that
character could be better or worse, higher or lower, and his ap-
proach to free speech is inseparable from this assumption.
Mill indeed presupposes a "prior ideal of excellence for human
beings further realized by allowing liberty of action and thought.""'
This is reflected in Mill's estimation not of mere idiosyncrasy of
speech and behavior32 but of "individual growth"33 and the "due
study and preparation"34 typically required therefor.
29 The freedom of the press may be added, if it is thought that this protection of the
printed word rests on a different base than freedom of speech.
30 Emerson, note 3 supra, at 14.
" Ladenson, A Philosophy of Free Expression and Its Constitutional Implications 152
(1983).
32 Id. at 150 ("it is ...a non sequitur to hold that someone who opposes conforming to
custom merely as custom must also believe that people should be encouraged to be idiosyn-
cratic simply for the sake of being idiosyncratic").
" See Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt L. Rev.
473, 483 (1974) (Mill's focus on "true belief and individual growth"; concern for "fostering
the development of better (more independent and inquiring) individuals").
31 Mill, On Liberty 33 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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Mill recognizes that not all forms and instances of speech in the
literal sense significantly implicate the values and aims underlying
freedom of speech. For example, "[t]he scope of Mill's defense of
freedom of expression does not cover the dissemination of informa-
tion, whether true or false, about a person's private life which has
no bearing on the scientific, moral, political, religious, and social
issues with which he is concerned. 35
Outside the context of his narrow discussion of free speech, but
with implications for current free speech issues, Mill observed un-
hesitatingly that 36
there are many acts which, being directly injurious only to the
agents themselves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but
which, if done publicly, are a violation of good manners, and
coming thus within the category of offenses against others, may
rightly be prohibited. Of this kind are offenses against decency;
on which it is unnecessary to dwell.
This is plainly some distance from the late twentieth century free
speech jurisprudence that fashionably, if ultimately incoherently,
rejects ethical skepticism while settling for an ethical relativism in
which one man's indecency is another man's lyric. It also reinforces
the necessity for some sort of social idea for protected speech to be
present. For Mill, the indecent is, at least sometimes, not only
recognizable and is not simply to be shunned as a matter of uncon-
strained moral preference, but it is also subject to authoritative legal
prohibition.
Even where the issue is not susceptibility to prohibition, Mill is
not reluctant to distinguish greater and lesser value on grounds
other than mere subjective preference. He unselfconsciously asserts
that "[i]t may be better to be a John Knox than an Alicibiades, 37 but
it is better to be a Pericles than either; nor would a Pericles, if we
" Ten, Mill on Liberty 136 (1980).
36 Mill, note 34 supra, at 91. See also Ten, note 35 supra, at 106-07; Honderich, 'On
Liberty' and Morality-Dependent Harms, 30 Pol. Studies 504-11 (1983). A computer re-
search session suggests that this interesting passage has been quoted only once in recent
reported American jurisprudence, and that, appropriately, in dissent. See In re Excelsior
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the States, 3 N.Y.2d 237, 256, (1957) (Burke,
J., dissenting). But cf. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart, in East and West 50-51 (1980)
(reference to "destructive and irresponsible freedom" being granted "boundless scope").
3' For evidence of Alcibiades' less than sterling character, see Thucydides, The Pelopon-
nesian War 456, 565, 570, 585-86 (R. Warner trans. 1954).
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had one in these days, be without anything good which belonged to
John Knox."'3 8
This, again, is to suggest not that Mill advocated the legal pro-
scription of all that he considered decadent or depraved but merely
that there can be no Millian reasons for barring any legal action
against that which does not implicate Millian values. Within the
sphere of liberty of thought and discussion, Mill is concerned es-
sentially with that which rises to the level of "doctrine," as when he
asserts at his most radical that "there ought to exist the fullest
liberty of professing and discussion, as a matter of ethical convic-
tion, any doctrine, however immoral it may be considered."'39
For speech in a literal sense to be speech in a protectable, First
Amendment sense, though, it must rise to the level of recognizable
"doctrine" or of factual assertion or evaluative "opinion" that may
in at least some sense be either true or false. This much is clear even
from Mill's famous recapitulation of his arguments for liberty of
thought and discussion, where he iterates his arguments on infalli-
bility, on the likelihood of partial truth, and on the necessity of
vigorous contest to promote vital, as opposed to thoughtless,
merely prejudiced belief.4 ° If the putative speech cannot be en-
visioned as some sort of direct, if minor, contribution to a social or
intellectual debate continuing over time, in which there is perhaps a
consensus or an array of contesting schools of thought that now
approach, now recede from the truth, Millian values are not signifi-
cantly implicated.
We resist this clear understanding of Mill largely on the assump-
tion that Mill, like many of us, must have subscribed to a sort of
nonjudgmental, nonhierarchical general libertarianism. 4' But this is
38 Mill, note 34 supra, at 59. See also Mill, Utilitarianism 12-13 (Sher ed. 1977) ("no
intelligent human being would consent to be a fool .. . even though they should be per-
suaded that the fool is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs").
39 Mill, note 34 supra, at 17 n.2.
40 Id. at 50.
41 It should be clear at this point that any claim that a broad conduct libertarianism
underlies and informs the Free Speech Clause is illogical on its own terms, obviously histori-
cally anachronistic, contrary to Millian logic, language, and assumptions, and currently
inconsistent with a vast panoply of widely accepted paternalistic statutes and judicial deci-
sions, none of which is commonly thought by libertarian opponents to be in logical tension
with the Free Speech Clause. Certainly, a broadly libertarian society, however conceived,
would by definition proscribe at least certain kinds of restraints on speech, but it remains
unclear why liberty of speech must be more central to a libertarian society, or receive greater
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inconsistent not only with Mill's arguments and their underlying
premises but also with the unmistakable tone or flavor of Mill's
language throughout On Liberty. Mill insists on the capacity for
"being improved" as a prerequisite to the regime of free speech.42
He appeals "to the permanent interests of man as a progressive
being."43 His emphasis is on not merely thinking for oneself but
also thinking for oneself "with due study and preparation."' He
approves Humboldt's exaltation of "the highest and most harmoni-
ous development of [humanity's] powers to a complete and consis-
tent whole"4 5 as the dictate of reason. Choosing one's "plan of life"
calls for "observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee,
activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide,
and ...firmness and self-control to hold to [one's] deliberate de-
cision. ' 4 1
Mill refers without embarrassment to "human excellence"47 and
goes on to specify that "individuality is the same thing with devel-
opment. '4 ' He is careful to link eccentricity with "strength of
character" 49 and to observe that "the amount of eccentricity in a
society has generally been proportional to the amount of genius,
mental vigor, and moral courage it contained."50 The ultimate aim
remains "cultivation of higher nature."'
This is not to suggest that only that which is universally recog-
protection, than liberty in plainly nonspeech commercial market transactions, or in child
raising and family relations, or in education, or physical movement. In a word, just as the
Due Process Clause does not enact Mr. Spencer's Social Statics, the Free Speech Clause does
not enact Mr. Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia. Cf. Commonwealth v. Kautz, 491 A.2d
864, 865 (Pa. 1985) (citing Mill's principle of"liberty of tastes and pursuits" and declining to
adhere to it in the context of mandatory motorcycle helmets). But of. Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977) (rejecting paternalistic elements of
ordinance restricting the flow of housing market information).
42 Mill, note 34 supra, at 11.
41 Id. at 12.
4Id. at 33.
41 Id. at 54.
4 Id. at 56. None of this is to suggest, of course, that Mill would seek to suppress the
speech of those who disagree with the worthiness of Millian values or with any particular
conception of their realization.
47 Id. at 59.
4 Id. at 60.
49 Id. at 63.
so Ibid.
11 Id. at 64.
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nized as decent and uplifting can be entitled to special protection. 2
The point is merely to elaborate on Millian values, in the absence of
which there is no point in according special constitutional protec-
tion to a given instance of expression.
It is only the prestige and convenience of Mill's elaborate theory
that suggests focusing on Mill and "Millian values." One could, as
well, imaginatively resurrect Socrates in the role of constitutional
arbiter, to the same end.
It is occasionally suggested that a linkage between the Free
Speech Clause and Millian or other values is illegitimate and not
textually warranted. William Van Alstyne has said:5 3
The first amendment does not link the protection it provides
with any particular objective and may, accordingly, be deemed
to operate without regard to anyone's view of how well the
speech it protects may or may not serve such an objective. The
second amendment expressly links the protection it provides
with a stated objective ... and might, therefore, be deemed to
operate only insofar as the right it protects ... can be shown to
be connected with that objective.
The problem is that, if we try to remain agnostic about the aims,
purposes, or values underlying the Free Speech Clause, there is no
reliable, nonarbitrary guide for inclusion or exclusion as "speech."
Literalism fails us, since a Morse Code message or sign language
may plainly implicate First Amendment values without being
speech in a literal sense.5 4 Can something be "symbolic" speech?"5
52 See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
462 U.S. 1132 (1983). See also Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356 (9th
Cir.) cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 56 (1985), in which the court confessed that: "[v]e fear that if
school officials had the unbridled discretion to apply a standard as subjective and elusive as
'indecency' in controlling the speech of high school students, it would increase the risk of
cementing white, middle-class standards for determining what is acceptable and proper
speech and behavior in our public schools. Language that may be considered 'indecent' in
one segment of our heterogeneous society may be common, household usage in another." Id.
at 1363. What the public schools may have overlooked in their rush toward standardlessness
along with the Ninth Circuit, aside from the utility of the Equal Protection Clause, is that
one defends the decency or propriety of one's language not by claiming that it is common in
one's own ethnic or other group to speak or act as one did but by claiming that one's language
gave no gratuitous, unnecessary offense to significant numbers of likely bearers from other
ethnic or class groups.
" Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 107, 112
n.13 (1982).
" See Hart, The Concept of Law 124, 126 (1961) on the logic and practical necessity of
recourse to underlying purposes. This need could not be dispensed with merely by the
framers' omission of a prefatory statement of purposes in the text of the Amendment itself.
" See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S.Ct. 3065 (1984)
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Recourse to the purposes of the Free Speech Clause, as recognized
by one or more drafters or by other persons, is necessary in order to
decide.
Bearing the Millian values in mind not only permits the prin-
cipled resolution of free speech cases but also permits, in many
instances, their more expeditious and less logically tortuous resolu-
tion as well. The complexity of the Supreme Court's treatment, in
various contexts, of "low value" speech, meriting some, but only
limited, free speech protection, has been described by Professor
Stone. 6 At least some "low value" speech is, in the absence of any
significant implication of Millian values, actually "zero value" or,
more simply, nonspeech, meriting no Free Speech Clause protec-
tion at all. 7
(prohibition of demonstrators from sleeping in Lafayette Park); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405 (1974) (attachment of peace symbol to flag); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing black armband in school); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (draft card-burning case). In the recent case of Monroe v. State Court, 739 F.2d
568 (1 1th Cir. 1984), a flag-burning case, the court held that, if there is an "intent to convey a
particularized message . . . and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it..., the activity falls within
the scope of the first and fourteenth amendments.' "Id. at 570 (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at
410-11). While it is disheartening to learn that to speak unclearly or over the heads of one's
audience is to forfeit free speech protection, and while it is not clear that just any kind of"particularized message" will do, the main point is that this requirement is certainly not
drawn from the text of the First Amendment, even by fair inference.
% See Stone, note 4 supra, at 194-96. See also Stone, Restrictions of Speech because of Its
Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 81 (1978).
" This is not to suggest, of course, that no close case will appear, or that interesting
problems cannot be devised in Millian analysis. Consider the actual, if perhaps unlitigated,
case of a sticker reading, in full, "the invasion of Nicaragua." By itself, the sticker conveys no
social idea nor othervise implicates Millian values. It is therefore not "speech" at all. But
consider that the sticker is red, and assume that it is designed to be not easily removed once
applied. Apparently, the only use for the sticker is an illegal one: to be affixed just below the
word "Stop" on a traffic sign. The aim of an ordinance flatly prohibiting the manufacture of
such a sticker would be to narrowly effectuate reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions. But the effect of prohibition may be just that. It is certainly not obvious precisely what
tests to impose on putative speech that does not rise to the level of a social idea absent
illegality.
Some instances of speech may more deeply implicate Millian values than others, indepen-
dent of any assessment of the speech's falsity or perniciousness. It may be, for instance, that
certain forms or modes of speech, apart from subject matter, tend to more deeply implicate
Millian values than others.
Mill suggests that "[a]n opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private
property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but
may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among the same mob in the form of a placard."
Mill, note 34 supra, at 53. While Mill's emphasis here is on a clear and present danger rule,
there is also the suggestion that speech in the form of articles may implicate Millian values
more deeply than mass oratory or placards, as a general rule. The general hierarchy seems
clear: books, articles, and leaflets may tend to be more precise, richer, more articulate, or
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It is possible that the speech-nonspeech distinction may turn out,
eventually, to bear a family resemblance to the doctrine of public
issue or public matter speech versus private interest speech as de-
veloped by the Supreme Court in several contexts.8 Of course, the
Court has thus far continued to accord concededly private or per-
sonal interest speech some limited measure of Free Speech Clause
protection .5 9 The public-private interest speech distinction must be
further clarified if it is to be consistently applied in a convincing
way. 60
IV. ENTERTAINMENT AND MILLIAN VALUES
Entertainment is not necessarily beyond the compass of the
Free Speech Clause. Some instances of entertainment, such as pro-
test songs or satiric comedy, clearly tend to implicate Millian
values. But many forms of entertainment do not. It is unmistak-
ably the law that even, or especially, in a commercial context,"nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections
from official regulation." 61 While this result has not been univer-
self-incriminating intellectually than placards, slogans, banners, and bumper stickers. The
world may be better off to the extent that there is a reasonably social class-neutral legal
incentive to publish, rather than to sloganeer. Articulateness is not the sole Millian value, or
even the dominant or controlling Millian value, but it is a Millian value.
Frederick Schauer has denied the wisdom of drawing this general qualitative distinction in
constitutional terms. His argument is that we are bombarded with so much speech nowadays
that, in order to be heard, we must each perhaps speak more offensively, or literally or
figuratively raise our voice above the din of other speech to acquire or maintain an audience.
See Schauer, Note 23 supra, at 201-02. The general futility of this advice seems clear; one
might as well counsel all spectators at a football game to stand up in order to see better.
" See e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 2939 (1985)
(commercial defamation case); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (public employment
discharge case). See also Chaffee, note 5 supra, at 6, 11, 18, 19 (focus on "matters of public
interest").
"' See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 ("We do not suggest... that Myers' speech, even if
not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the First
Amendment"). But see Jones v. Memorial Hosp. System, 677 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1985) ("The federal courts have declined to require protection of speech on matters
solely of personal interest. To be entitled to first amendment protection, speech must relate
to matters of 'political, social, or other concern to the community.' ") (quoting Connick, 461
U.S. at 146); Meiklejohn, note 7 supra at 79 ("Private speech, or private interest in speech...
has no claim whatever to the protection of the First Amendment").
o Part of the lack of clarity of this distinction, resulting in a very dubious analysis in
Greenmoss, is attributable to the near emptiness of the Court's "content, form, and context"
test, Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, and part to the conceptual ambiguity of "interest." See
generally Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (1970).
61 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
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sally acclaimed, 62 it seems solidly entrenched. The problem is that
not all nonobscene commercial nude dancing, for example, pur-
ports to convey a social idea in the relevant sense, nor need Millian
values otherwise be significantly implicated. As a result, the courts
feel "bound to treat topless dancing as a form of expression which is
protected at least to some extent by the first amendment," while
recognizing that " 'few of us would march our sons and daughters
off to war' to protect that form of expression."63
It has been suggested in a broader context, though, that sexually
related "speech" "will almost invariably carry an implicit, if not
explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual mores.... In our
society, the very presence of sexual explicitness in speech seems
ideologically significant, without regard to whatever other mes-
sages might be intended."64
It would seem, however, that advocacy of relaxed sexual mores is
something imputed to commercial nude dancing or something in-
vested by the third parties in the concept, rather than a message in
any sense sent and received. One clue is that "sexual mores" is
obviously broader than the activities encompassed by commercial
nude dancing. One might even suspect that the hidden agenda of
commercial nude dancing may be not the relaxation of sexual mores
but keeping them the way they are so that the customers will be
motivated to return and pay to watch again. Then again, there may
be no intent, explicit or implicit, in operation other than merely to
profit or merely to entertain-diversion for its own sake, rather
than to make a point.6"
62 See, e.g., Judge Richard Posner's reiterated misgivings in Douglass v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1141 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Art... even of the artless sort represented
by 'topless' dancing-today enjoys extensive protection in the name of the First Amend-
ment") (contrasting an alternative of protecting only "political" speech); Piarowski v. Illinois
Community College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932-34 (1975)); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949-50
(7th Cir. 1983) (contrasting "political" and "cultural" expression) (relying on Chaffee, note 5
supra, at 7-33). See also Bork, note 2 supra, at 27. But see Wellington, note 18 supra, at 1115-
16. Attempting to distinguish between the political and the cultural, at least in broad senses
of the terms, appears to be profoundly difficult. Nor does Mill give us any reason to do so.
6- Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 854 (I th Cir. 1985) (quoting Young v.
American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)).
" Stone, note 56 supra, at 111-12. But cf the sexually explicit, but ideologically pointless,
language of the "cop abuse" cases discussed iinfra at notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., State v. House, 676 P.2d 892, 896 (1984) (en banc) (Rossman, J., dissenting),
aff'd 299 Or. 78, 698 P.2d 951 (1985). It is certainly possible, of course, that requiring
merely the conveyance of some social idea, as a necessary and sufficient condition to acquir-
166 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
If the "message" of commercial nude dancing is so shadowy and
equivocal, however, it is too attenuated and insubstantial
significantly to implicate Millian values.6 6 Further, and more con-
troversially, there is no reason necessarily to assume that the Mil-
lian pointlessness of commercial nude dancing must depend on a
finding of bad taste, lewdness, indecency, obscenity, or widespread
offensiveness. A claim of free speech protection for a given activity
may "trivialize" 67 the Free Speech Clause because of the Millian
pointlessness of the activity, and not because the activity is judged
immoral, or harmful, or lewd, or misleading. 68
In a slightly different context, the Eleventh Circuit recently has
detected no advocacy or expression of ideas in connection with
nude sunbathing, despite plaintiffs' claim that nude sunbathing "is
the practice by which they advocate and communicate their philos-
ophy that the human body is wholesome and that nudity is not
indecent."69 The plaintiffs sought to analogize their situation to that
involved in the protected commercial nude dancing cases, but the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument on the grounds that the
nude dancing cases, unlike nude sunbathing, involved "nudity in
combination with a protection form of expression."7° A problem
lies in the fact that non-sexually oriented social or recreational
ing at least some free speech protection, would in some contexts generate close questions by
setting up incentives for nonspeakers to clothe themselves with some free speech protection
by adorning themselves with some minimal speech. If the social idea is not expressed by or
integrated into the nude dance routine but is merely "worn about the neck" to ward off
constitutional attack, then only the readily severable social idea communication itself should
be protected by the Free Speech Clause. There is generally no need to inquire whether the
invokers of the Free Speech Clause "really" believe in, or even vaguely understand, their
own protected and protective social idea.
" The assumption that commercial nude dancing is ordinarily sought to be suppressed
because of its "content," in the same sense in which a regime might seek to suppress Das
Kapital or Mein Kampf because of dislike of or unpopularity of its content, seems doubtful.
See Krueger, 759 F.2d at 854.
67 Highway Tavern Corp. v. McLaughlin, 105 A.D.2d 122, 139, 483 N.Y.S.2d 323, 338
(1984).
6 Of course, the state is understandably required to show more than mere triviality before
obtaining a criminal conviction. See, e.g., State v. Jacobson, 459 So. 2d 1285, 1290 (La. Ct.
App. 1984) (obscenity conviction); Erhardt v. State, 468 N.E.2d 224, 225 (Ind. 1984) (vacat-
ing 463 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)) (public indecency conviction).
69 South Florida Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 609-10 (11th Cir.
1984). In contrast, a Florida court has recognized a free speech right to beg alms for oneself,
despite the presumably limited message content involved. See C.C.B. v. State, 458 So. 2d
47, 48 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984).
70 734 F.2d at 610.
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dancing is generally not accorded any free speech protection at all,
despite the ability of articulate persons to generate plausible "mes-
sages," such as antipuritanicalism, that might be imputed to recre-
ational or social dancing.7'
Sorting these cases out, it appears that the courts attach crucial
First Amendment significance to a strict separation of performer
and audience. Persons in a group of social dancers are not viewed as
performing for themselves or for each other as an audience. Perfor-
mance dancing, nude or, presumably, otherwise, with an audience,
is protected, unlike social dancing, and it does not lose its "expres-
sive," protected quality when associated with nudity. Sunbathing
clad, however, is not an otherwise free speech protected activity,
and nudity adds or subtracts nothing in the way of free speech
protection to the sunbathing.72
The cases can probably thus be reconciled. What should not be
overlooked, however, is that there is no Millian value-based
rationale available to defend the results obtained if it is recognized
that the courts often protect putative speech that does not even
purport to convey any social idea.
If one turns to the video game free speech cases, one finds that
the possible analogy of video game screens to movies is generally
downplayed and that video games, at least at the present state of
technology, are typically said to fall afoul of the requirement that,
to enjoy free speech protection, the entertainment be intended to
convey some idea or information.73 This is an eminently sensible
result from a Millian standpoint and, despite contentions that some
video games vaguely inculcate distinctively martial values, should
stand until the video screen conveys, in a manner inextricable with
71 See, e.g., Jarman v. Williams, 753 F.2d 76, 78 (8th Cir. 1985) (assuming that the"message" intended is merely that dancing is not wrong); Kent's Lounge, Inc. v. City of New
York, 104 A.D.2d 397, 398, 478 N.Y.S.2d 928, 929 (1984) ("recreational dancing is not a
form of speech protected by the First Amendment") (further noting the absence of free
speech protection for rollerskating).
72 Break dancers are therefore advised to gather a discrete, separate audience-an audience
of one's fellow break dancers may not suffice; one must argue for their "receptivity" while not
taking their turn-and, secondarily, to try to think of some articulable message above and
beyond approval of break dancing.
7' See, e.g., Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 450
N.E.2d 605, 609, cert. dismissed, 104 S.Ct. 475 (1983); Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n, 387
Mass. 864, 868, 444 N.E.2d 922, 926-27 (1983); People v. Walker, 135 Mich. App. 267,
275, 354 N.W.2d 312, 316-17 (1984), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Walker v. Warren, 106
S.Ct. 32 (1985).
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what is sought to be prohibited, some sort of recognizable social
idea.
The idea or information requirement tends to go out the win-
dow, however, in other entertainment contexts, such as musical
performances. The First Amendment, it has been held, protects
the right to produce jazz concerts.7 4 Similarly, the bands marching
in Philadelphia's Mummers Parade, complete with "thematic ar-
rangement," are engaged in "a form of expressive entertainment"
protected by the First Amendment.75 The problem in focusing on
the "expressiveness" or performance aspect of the entertainment is,
of course, the determination to ignore the absence of any social
idea. Expressive entertainment in the form of juggling, plate
balancing, and the swallowing of swords or goldfish cannot be
distinguished in principle from the above sorts of performances. If
anything is clear about the First Amendment, it is that such activi-
ties, however captivating, are simply not speech.76
Again, though, these generalizations are subject to some excep-
tions. One could theoretically employ plate balancing as a medium
of social criticism. Since there are substantial risks, potentially, in
erroneously deciding free speech cases for or against the speaker,
which may be summed as the risks of decadence or loss of purpose
versus the risk of suppression, a case-by-case determination process
without the aid of specific presumptions seems called for here, even
if most cases of plate balancing do or do not turn out to involve
speech.
The logic of the entertainment cases is ultimately derived from the
now rather quaint "crime magazine" case of Winters v. New York. 77
74 See Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1063 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd
on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
71 See Tacynec v. City of Philadelphia, 687 F.2d 793, 796 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1172 (1983).
76 A somewhat more complex case is presented by Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank,
745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2115 (1985). The court, in a case
involving the concert promotion of several rock groups of arguably varying "hardness,"
indicated that "constitutional safeguards are not applicable only to musical expression that
implicates some sort of ideological content." Id. at 569. From a Millian value standpoint, one
would at least want to inquire into such matters as life-style endorsements or the contents of
song lyrics for the Free Speech Clause to be implicated. Actually, there was some evidence of
genuine, easily judicially detected content-based broadly political discrimination in Cinevi-
sion. See id. at 573.
77 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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The court indicated, in a free press clause context:78
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional
protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas.
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elu-
sive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar
with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's
amusement, teaches another's doctrine.
The Court in Winters was otherwise confident, of course, of its
ability reliably to detect the lewd, the indecent, and the absence of
social value in a publication.79 Its otherwise consistent judicial
modesty, however, is appropriate only with respect to recognizable
borderline cases. Obviously, propaganda in the guise of fiction is
ordinarily protectable speech on any theory. But it is unreasonable
to suggest that since there are undeniably borderline cases, it is
either impossible or pointless to recognize the substantial numbers
of instances in which the absence of any intent to convey a social
idea can be fairly and reliably detected.
V. PROFANITY AND THE ABUSE OF COPS, METER MAIDS,
AND CIVILIANS: THE CONJUNCTION OF CHAPLINSKY
AND COHEN
It may be that the very triviality of much pure entertain-
ment perversely inspires First Amendment protection: If it is so-
cially inconsequential, why permit its suppression? This brings
into isue the judicial refusal to defer to the legislative balancing of
the benefits and costs associated with the literally pointless pro-
hibited activity. There are a wide variety of cases of allegedly
socially pointless "speech" in which the alleged associated harms
range from public "pollutant" effects, such as a general coarsening
in the tenor of public discourse, to the taking of justified personal
offense, to the threat of physical violence.80
It must be conceded at the outset that, while the well-known
7' Id. at 510.
79 Ibid.
" See, e.g., Archibald Cox's argument that the expression at issue in Cohen imposed social
costs in the form of a lowering of the standard of public debate, in Cox, The Role of the
Supreme Court in American Government 47-48 (1976).
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Cohen case81 should not be defended in unduly romantic terms, Co-
hen was probably correctly decided in Millian value terms. In Co-
hen, a jacket bearing the inscription 81 "Fuck the Draft" inspired a
divided Court to observe that it is "often true that one man's vulgar-
ity is another's lyric"83 and to decline to "indulge the facile assump-
tion that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." 4 Whether or
not an attempt generally to forbid any particular words was ever at
issue, the Court in effect constitutionalized protection of the emo-
tive, as opposed to cognitive, force of language.85
But the Cohen result is defensible as a recognition of a particular
phrase, in historical context, that barely made it into the category
of "speech" by expressing a remarkably vague social idea about a
reasonably clearly specified social phenomenon, the draft. Whether
or not "Fuck" would have been speech by itself or not, "Fuck the
Draft," in context, probably was. More enthusiastic defenses seem
questionable.
It is suggested, for example, that "Resist the Draft" and "Fuck
the Draft" do not convey the same meaning,86 or that "Fuck the
Draft" says it twice as well, 8 or that the manner of expression in
Cohen is "more powerful, 88 or that, more generally, "[t]he use of
profanity ... is often an effective means for individuals to convey
81 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
82 Evidently, Cohen was not the author of the inscription, and the jacket in question was
covered with writing, among which the words "Fuck the Draft" did not particularly stand
out. See Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel, Justice Harlan,
and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 Duke L.J. 283, 286 & 286 n.21.
These details accord rather poorly with the image of a protester so overwrought with
intensity of indignation that he, unlike, say, Henry David Thoreau in Civil Disobedience,
could not reasonably be expected to convey this depth of feeling through mere nonprofane
speech.
83 403 U.S. at 25. Despite its judicial modesty in this respect, the Court remains fully
inclined to review judgments that distinguish protected material that "provokes only normai,
healthy sexual desires" from material that arouses "morbid" and presumably unhealthy
responses. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2799 (1985).
84 403 U.S. at 26.
85 Ibid.
86 See, e.g., Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First Amendment Protec-
tion, 9 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 19 n.98 (1974) (quoting Maiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is
There a Right Not to Be Spoken To? 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 153, 189 (1972)).
87 See Van Alstyne, note 53 supra, at 142.
88 See Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev.
113, 141 (1981).
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dramatically otherwise inexpressable emotions."89 It is pointed out
that "[n]ot everyone can be a Daniel Webster."9 °
None of these arguments is without point. Yet each can easily be
oversold. Despite its non-McCluhanesque tenor, there is some
sense in the observation that "[a] requirement that indecent lan-
guage be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive lan-
guage." 9  If a surgically neat form-content distinction is impossible,
it remains true that the slope connecting the proscribing of Cohen's
language in that particular context and banning or regulating
Thoreau is not terribly slippery.
The more central problem is that, without projecting our own
sentiments into Cohen, we simply cannot tell what "Fuck the Draft"
means well enough to pass informed judgments as to its power,
aptness, or effectiveness. We can, admittedly, dispute at the mar-
gins what Thoreau meant in a literal sense. But "Fuck the Draft,"
while it conveys enough meaning of a social character to cross the
line into speech, is not far from a blank sheet of paper. Does it
mean, roughly, as C. L. Stevenson might suggest, "I strongly dis-
approve of the draft," do so as well? Perhaps it means, in alienated
fashion, "I strongly disapprove of the draft, but/and I don't care
what you think": an entirely different message and one to which we
know Thoreau would not have subscribed.
The grounds of the objection are not hinted at. The draft may be
abhorrent for a variety of moral reasons or out of practical self-
interest. Obviously, a slogan can say only so much, and it is un-
reasonable to expect a speaker to pack an expository essay into a
slogan, but this only bespeaks the limited communicative value of
slogans and the riskiness at best of assuming that a slogan, profane
or otherwise, is likely to be particularly apt in expressing deep
frustrations.92 If we can't tell what Cohen meant at some level of
9 Stone, note 4 supra, at 244.
9 People v. Callahan, 168 Cal. App. 3d 631, 214 Cal. Rptr. 294, 296 (1985), op. with-
drawn, cert. denied, 54 USLW 3484 (Jan. 21, 1986).
"' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.,
joined by Burger, C. J., and Rehnquist, J.). Note that of these three, only Chief Justice
Burger was available to joint the dissenters in Coben.
92 It is interesting to note that Cohen's expression scans well only with moderate-level
alleged evil as a target. "Fuck Nazism," or "Fuck Genocide," or "Fuck Slavery," or "Fuck
Terrorism" are uninspiring partly because of the abstractness of the institution denounced
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detail, how can we know how well his slogan expressed his feel-
ings?
An interesting assumption at work in the defense of Cohen is that
a person's willingness consciously to violate basic norms of social
propriety, etiquette, or concern for the sensibilities of others, in-
cluding those of some of one's allies, implies that the person must
feel more strongly, deeply, or intensely than the rest of us, or than
Thoreau did, or than the person himself does on many other sub-
jects.
This is a fallacy, though. Some of us simply have a low threshold
of resort to predictably socially offensive behavior, quite apart from
the intensity of our "feelings."93 The feelings of others may simply
not be thought to matter much. So even if we are to accord free
speech protection to emotions, as opposed to ideas, we must not
assume the emotion from the willingness to offend.
Occasionally, the more enthusiastic defenders of Cohen discuss
social trends and touch on the incentives set up by Cohen.94 One
court has observed that "[w]hat is vulgar to one may be lyric to
another.... Some people spew four-letter words as their common
speech such as to devalue its currency; Billingsgate thus becomes
commonplace."95 This sort of argumentation, along with the obser-
vation that many words are less shocking now than they used to
be,96 is curiously reversible in its import. It would seem, all else
equal, that the degeneration of language or of the quality of discus-
sion is to be avoided. Any process of having to outbid one's compet-
itors for linguistic shock effect, worked out as a kind of Gresham's
but also because they are immediately recognizable as adolescent-minded trivialization of the
evils involved. We would not view them as "effective" or "powerful" statements.
" Consider the facial expression of the next person who violates the rules and breaches
decorum by playing his radio aloud on the bus. Does he seem to have an unusually intense
devotion to music that has resulted in the dictates of social propriety being outweighed? Or
does he merely look as bored as the rest of us? We must not simply read fervor and
commitment into Cohen-type situations.
94 403 U.S. at 25. See also Rutzick, note 86 supra, at 20; Bollinger, Free Speech and
Intellectual Values, 92 Yale L.J. 438, 470 (1983). If one does not believe that there are long-
term, subtle, but significant consequences flowing from this judicial relativism, one need not
fear being soon confronted by clear, vigorous, empirical proof to the contrary. We tend to be
skeptical that societies decay culturally, but we do recognize this phenomenon writ small, as
in the obviously decaying morale of a baseball team as it slides toward the cellar.
" Callahan, note 90 supra.
96 1d.
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Law among the tokens of language, would similarly seem a bad
thing.
Lost amid the relativism of Cohen is the obvious point that even if
we cannot reliably tell vulgarity from lyric, we can reasonably well
predict that what we view as lyric will or will not be found gratui-
tously offensive by substantial numbers of reasonably tolerant peo-
ple. Protected speech may be rude or offensive, particularly where
the rudeness or offensiveness is inseparable from the message. But
elevating or at least maintaining the level or quality of the debate is
a Millian value. While not all of us can rise to the level of a Daniel
Webster or a Thoreau, this is not what the detractors of Cohen
would require. The question is whether it would be constitution-
ally permissible, under the Free Speech Clause, to require an even
slightly closer approach to the level of a Daniel Webster than Cohen
manifests if we are to address the public. The aim is not to ban any
usage per se or to disenfranchise the inarticulate but to require of
all speakers a certain minimum, easily attained level of respect for
the feelings of many among the audience. It has been suggested
that97
offensiveness is often an important part of a speaker's message.
Use of offensive language reveals the existence of something
offensive and ugly, whether in the situation described by the
speaker or in the speaker's mind itself. In either event, the lan-
guage reveals an important though unpleasant truth about the
world. Suppressing this language violates a cardinal principle of
a free society, that truths are better confronted than re-
pressed .... We cannot expect to have, nor should we require,
true civility in discourse until we achieve civility in society.
Of course, an assassination attempt on a popular political figure
also may reveal an important truth, but the issue is whether the
price is worth paying. By the time of Cohen's speech, the "truth"
about the draft-that it was profoundly immoral, let us say-had
already been "said" and was already generally "known." From con-
trary speech, we also already generally "knew" the "truth" that the
draft was a fine thing. What we actually learned from Cohen's
speech was mostly about Cohen, and, as we have seen, Cohen's
speech told us very little about him or the state of his mind at all.
" Farber, note 82 supra, at 302.
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What we learned probably qualifies as neither particularly unpleas-
ant nor important.
At the time of Cohen's speech, no one doubted the controver-
siality of the draft or the willingness of many persons to speak
indecorously. Nor is there, ultimately, any clear reason to hold a
minimal civility in public discourse hostage until such a time as we
have achieved civility in society. The former has not been shown to
be an impediment to achieving the latter, and it may perhaps be its
prerequisite. If the two forms of civility are causally independent,
why not enjoy the former while we await the arrival of the latter?
At a minimum, it is unclear why we are bound by the Free Speech
Clause never to accord the effect of a given speech on the level of
discussion any weight at all, even where the effect on the level of
debate is undisputed.
Perhaps on the theory, though, that grievances are better aired
than compulsorily bowdlerized, a recent Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals case has, on the strength of Cohen, given free speech protec-
tion to the display on a pickup truck bumper of a sticker reading
"Fuck Charles Foti, Jr."98 Mr. Foti was a local sheriff. The court
displayed no great interest in attempting to distinguish Cohen, per-
haps on the grounds that, while a jacket may be discreetly taken off
and folded up, there may be a felt necessity to park a truck in a
given space regardless of the presence of, say, a school yard or
playground in the vicinity.
Actually, it may be that the only way of distinguishing the case is
to take the direct route. Except under rare circumstances not dis-
cussed in the Foti opinion itself, "Fuck Charles Foti, Jr." does not
convey even a rudimentary social idea, even if Mr. Foti is relatively
well known locally. Whether such an expression is printed on a
bumper sticker, inscribed on a jacket, or chiseled in marble on the
author's front lawn, it is, in most circumstances, simply too diffuse
and "open" to significantly implicate Millian values, even granting
that it rises in significance above mere random lettering. Unlike
"Fuck the Draft," it does not even psychologically tie in with or
trigger thoughts on any particular social issue. 99 Attempts at selec-
98 See State v. Meyers, 462 So. 2d 227, 227 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
Apparently, though, there are limits to Cohen's power to sanctify the emotive. In a
recent case, the Seventh Circuit announced that it was unable to locate "any authority for the
proposition that the first amendment ... protects [a person's] right to kick and rock a video
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tive enforcement should be obvious where the political context
suggests that a particular idea, far from being so diffuse and open as
to be unrecognizable, is actually being suppressed as unpopular or
disfavored by the judge.
A much more common instance of Millian nonspeech involving
the police, though often adjudicated as protected "low" speech, is
that of directing streams of epithets, sometimes for remarkably
prolonged periods of time, at an arresting or investigating police
officer. Typically, the speaker is indignant, for reasons that are
only rarely ascertainable from the judicial opinion, at the prior
arrest of himself or a friend or relative.' 00 One suspects that, in
some of the cases, the motivation is simply the inconvenience asso-
ciated with being arrested. Often, the purported speech is associ-
ated with a physical disturbance or resistance to arrest. Sometimes
a crowd gathers. In a noteworthy proportion of the cases, the
speaker appears to have been drinking immoderately. Despite per-
haps even an intent to offend, and the absence of any social idea
being communicated, 1 the purported speech is often judicially
protected as free speech,'0 2 the disorderly conduct or breach of
game to retrieve fifty cents." Friedman v. Village of Skokie, 763 F.2d 236, 239 (7th Cir.
1985). In this case, the coin return had been welded inoperable and a no-refund policy
instituted. Cohen was not mentioned, despite the obvious possibility of arguing for a largely
emotive, and perhaps efficacious, "expressive" protest over a legitimate or imagined "griev-
ance." Apparently, no property was damaged or threatened, and mere words would not have
sufficed, under the circumstances. See id. at 237. If it turned out that Mr. Friedman did not
literally speak in the course of having "attracted the attention of 20 to 30 people who looked
on," ibid., it must be pointed out that constitutionally protected nude dancers need not keep
up a monologue.
"00 It is difficult to envision the typical defendant as exercising autonomy in the literal form
of Kantian legislation. See Kant, The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics
38, 47, 52 (Manthey-Zorn ed. 1966).
101 Occasionally, a brief, unelaborated reference to the race of one or more of the officers is
made. See, e.g., State in re W. B., 461 So. 2d 366, 368 (La. Ct. App. 1984). A coherent focus
on the unjustness of "the system" would also help the defendant in Millian terms.
102 When such results are reached, the most typical rationale is that the police are or should
be inured to abusive language, that they did not in fact react to the verbal provocation, and
that they are paid to not be provoked and are under a legal duty in that regard. The case is
therefore held not to fall within the scope of the "fighting words" exception laid down in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Sometimes the strand of the Chap-
linsky test focusing on the tendency of the language to inflict injury drops out of the analysis
entirely. See, e.g., Harbin v. State, 358 So. 2d 856 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978); Rutzick, note 86
supra, at 22-27. Police restraint or indifference, however, does not add social content to the
prior "speech." Occasionally, the invective is defended on a theory of the beneficial effects of
catharsis. See, e.g., Redish, note 22 supra, at 626. While theories of catharsis or of "blowing
off steam" in various contexts have a long and distinguished intellectual pedigree, the experi-
mental support for such theories is limited at best. SeeJ. Goldstein, Aggression and Crimes
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peace charge dismissed, and any "reasonably necessary" force used
physically to resist the "illegal" arrest immunized.
An example, selected for the moderation, and not the extremity,
of its facts, would be the case of State v. Montgomery.'0 3 The appel-
lant in Montgomery initiated the incident by loudly shouting a series
of profanities, for example, "fucking pigs, fucking pig ass hole,"' 4
at 10:50 P.M. on a cold February night in downtown Seattle as the
two targeted police officers were passing by on patrol in their car.
When the police stopped to investigate, the appellant, who was
eventually charged with possession of marijuana, continued in a
similar linguistic vein. Eventually, it was determined that a recent
drinking citation had left the fifteen-year-old appellant irate.
Despite repeated attempts to settle the appellant down, he con-
tinued to express himself loudly. Eventually a crowd gathered,
which, though sizable enough to block the sidewalk, was not itself
threatening or hostile. The appellant did not physically threaten
the officers and was not carrying a weapon. Largely because of the
sidewalk blocking, the appellant was, after a total of about five to
ten minutes, arrested and charged with disorderly conduct and
possession of a controlled substance.
On appeal, the convictions for disorderly conduct and for posses-
sion of marijuana were reversed on free speech grounds,' 05 with the
court citing Chaplinsky and Cohen and determining that the appel-
lant's conduct deserved moral, but not legal, "censure and re-
buke."'0 6 The majority, unmoved by a dissenter's observation that
"I fail to see that the 'freedom of speech' contemplated by the First
Amendment has anything whatsoever to do with this case,"'0 7 in-
of Violence 36, 48, 50, 53, 55, 164 (1975). It is certainly equally plausible to suppose that
tolerating, if not actually rewarding, prolonged screaming at police officers legitimizes or
encourages such behavior. In any event, this kind of theorizing would not seem to fall within
the special competence of the judiciary.
103 31 Wash. App. 745, 644 P.2d 747 (1982).
'04 Id. at 747-48, 644 P.2d at 748-49.
os Id. at 760, 644 P.2d at 756.
106 Ibid. Courts that reverse misdemeanor convictions on this kind of analysis often seek, at
least rhetorically, to have it both ways. In one case, the conviction was reversed, but the
defendant was solemnly informed that the special restraint required of the police "does not
give the public a right to abuse a police officer." People v. Justus, 57 Ill. App. 3d 164, 167,
372 N.E.2d 1115, 1118 (1978). Presumably, a constitutional right is indeed some sort of a
right.
107 31 Wash. App. at 761, 644 P.2d at 757.
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stead noted the "commonplace" nature of the language em-
ployed. 108
The logical centerpiece of the majority's own independent analy-
sis of the issues noted that' 0 9
were the use of the invectives and vulgarisms used by the defen-
dant to be held to be grounds for arrest, a number of professional
tennis players and other public figures in sports and entertain-
ment would be subject to arrest for their language, oft repeated.
Shrinking from this disturbing prospect, the court in effect con-
stitutionalized its own weighting of the competing interests in-
volved. Because there are some sound, practical reasons for not
arresting tennis players, free speech must be involved. "0
But it is not a mere verbal quibble to distinguish, for Millian
value or free speech purposes, between the proposition that fifteen-
year-olds, including the speaker, should be permitted publicly to
drink or to smoke marijuana, and the almost purely emotive expres-
sions of a negative attitude, of some sort, toward one's own arrest.
If no particular grounds for concluding that the original arrest was
unfair or discriminatory or arbitrary or illegitimate are given, we
are left merely with a negative attitude toward one's own arrest, in
particular, principle aside. Verbalizing merely this attitude does
not rise to the level of a recognizable attempt to convey or express a
social idea in the relevant sense. 1 1 If a social idea is not present, the
fact that the target of verbal abuse did not or, if reasonable, would
'0" Id. at 756 n.2, 644 P.2d at 754 n.2. Courts rarely pause to inquire whether there may be
any connection between the increasing frequency of "reprehensible and disgraceful" lan-
guage and their own increasing inclination to protect it on free speech grounds. See id. at
760, 644 P.2d at 756.
109 Ibid.
"10 Perhaps part of the problem is that affirming a disorderly conduct or breach of peace
conviction involves at least some modest cost to the particular, identifiable individual defen-
dant, whereas on the other side of the ledger, a presumably desensitized police officer aside,
there are only abstract, longer term principles and broader policy considerations, the validity
of many of which cannot be rigorously demonstrated.
... The role in the analysis of the defendant's use of profanity becomes equivocal, particu-
larly in light of the inclination of some courts to focus exclusively on a threat of breach of
peace issue, rather than the injurious offensiveness of the language, in Cbaplinsky-type cases.
See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); see also note 102 supra. There is sometimes the
sentiment that the disorderly conduct conviction should be upheld even if, under the circum-
stances, the defendant had loudly and prolongedly recited nursery rhymes. See, e.g., Morris
v. State, 335 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1976); Mesarosh v. State, 459 N.E.2d 426, 430 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984) (Young, J., concurring).
Yet it is difficult to believe that courts would not take into consideration the saltiness of the
language if a loud, extended, socially pointless tirade were directed by a nonthreatening
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not be expected to breach the peace in response is not relevant to
the adjudication of the free speech constitutional claim." 2
VI. CONCLUSION
Obviously, the notion of "Millian" values has a broader
range of operation than its application to the cases here considered.
Perhaps they are more readily invoked in the cases noted than in
more controversial areas of application, such as the realm of defa-
mation and dissemination of commercial information or misinfor-
mation. I meant here only to start a debate, not to conclude it.
Understandably, we should be leery about not crediting a free
speech claim. But it should be clear that not every principled at-
tempt to limit the expansion of the scope of coverage of the Free
Speech Clause reflects a desire to impose orthodoxy or to root out
error. While the scope of the Clause should not be artificially cir-
cumscribed, as by narrowing its coverage to plainly political issues,
neither should it be assumed that the Free Speech Clause has a
scope unrelated to its recognizable purposes."11
defendant, say, at a nun. We may assume that the nun would not be expected to breach the
peace by reacting violently. At least she would be under a recognizable duty not to do so.
This scenario is what currently passes for a fiendishly difficult free speech case. While no
nun abuse case appears to have been recently decided on appeal, there is the interesting
meter maid abuse case of Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54, appeal
dismissed, 449 U.S. 894 (1980). In Mastrangelo, the disorderly conduct conviction was up-
held despite the lack of evidence of any immediate breach of the peace. The court may have
been moved by the fact that the absence of any breach of the peace may have been attribut-
able to the meter maid's having been too frightened to patrol in the area of the defendant's car
for a week. The court may also have believed that the injuring, desensitizing process is
confined to regular police officers, as opposed to meter maids. Cf. People v. John V., 167
Cal. App. 3d 761, 213 Cal. Rptr. 503 (1985) (sixteen-year-old civilian female target of
repeated profane abuse; previous reaction by target included swinging baseball bat at of-
fender and hitting boyfriend instead; speaker's conviction upheld under free speech challenge).
112 The sociological richness of the "fighting words" cases is only hinted at by the examples
cited above. See also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227 (1lth Cir. 1985); Bovey v. City of
Lafayette, 586 F. Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ind. 1984); aff'd mem., 774 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1985);
State v. Beckenbach, 1 Conn. App. 669, 476 A.2d 591 (Conn. 1984); State v. Nelson, 38
Conn. Super. 349, 448 A.2d 214 (1982); Cavazos v. State, 455 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983); State v. Beck, 9 Kan. App. 2d 459, 682 P.2d 137 (1984); State in re W. B., 461 So. 2d
366 (La. Ct. App. 1984); State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980); State v. Groves, 219
Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985); People v. DuPont, 107 A.D.2d 247, 486 N.Y.S.2d 169
(1985); City of Seattle v. Camby, 38 Wash. App. 462, 685 P.2d 665 (1984), rev'd, 104 Wash.
2d49, 701 P.2d 499 (1985) (en banc); Statev. Yoakum, 30 Wash. App. 874, 638 P.2d 1264(1982).
113 Confining the application of the Free Speech Clause to its defensible and proper scope
might well vaguely and minimally advantage some persons and disadvantage others in cer-
tain contexts, but these effects cannot in principle extend to conflicts between recognizable
interest groups, parties, or political forces and causes. Social cause speech remains within the
scope of speech and cannot be legitimately exiled as nonspeech.
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